Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron-Ferejohn model of bargaining over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement. In standing committees, however, existing agreements can be amended. This paper studies an extension of the Baron-Ferejohn framework to a model with an evolving default that reflects this important feature of policymaking in standing committees: In each of an infinite number of periods, the ongoing default can be amended to a new policy (which is, in turn, the default for the next period). The model provides a number of quite different predictions. (i) From a positive perspective, the key distinction turns on whether the quota is less than unanimity. In that case, patient enough players waste substantial shares of the pie each period and the size principle fails in some pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria. By contrast, the unique Markov perfect equilibrium outcome in a unanimity committee coincides with that in the corresponding Baron-Ferejohn framework. (ii) If players have heterogeneous discounts then a large class of subgame perfect equilibria (including all Markov perfect equilibria) are inefficient with a nonunanimity quota, and all subgame perfect equilibria are inefficient with a nonunanimity quota.
Introduction
Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard BaronFerejohn model of bargaining in an ad hoc committee over the division of a single pie:
players earn an exogenously fixed default payoff until the committee reaches an agreement, when negotiations end. However, many committees (such as legislatures) are dynamic in two senses: (i) their members reach a sequence of policy agreements (so the committee is standing), and (ii) a new pie is divided according to the same proportions as the last pie unless the last agreement is amended (so the default is endogenous). In this paper, we study a model which captures these dynamic aspects of policy making. Each period begins with a default policy (i.e. a division of the pie among players) inherited from the previous period; and a player is randomly drawn to make a proposal which is then voted up or down by the committee; if voted up, the proposal is implemented and becomes the new default; if voted down, the ongoing default is implemented and remains in place until the next period. This process continues ad infinitum. This model naturally represents Congressional legislation on social policy and entitlements: the previously agreed law remains in place until Congress decides to amend it.
From a formal point of view, this model of a standing committee yields a bargaining game with an endogenous default in which a pie is available for division each period.
In contrast to Baron and Ferejohn (1989) , we allow players to have different discount factors, and any concave utility functions; we consider any quota (including majority and unanimity rules); and we allow players to be selected to propose with different probabilities.
Analysis of this game raises various interesting questions, such as: (1) When do stationary
Markov perfect equilibria (SMPEs) exist and, when they do, are their outcomes unique?
(2) Must each pie be divided between a minimal winning majority -as predicted by the size principle -in every SMPE? (3) Is each pie fully divided (that is, is the division of the pie statically efficient) in every SMPE? (4) Are equilibria Pareto efficient? (5) How does the endogeneity of the evolving default affect SMPE outcomes? And (6) How do the answers to these questions depend on the quota?
The literature on standing committees has only posed the first two questions. Our contribution is to bypass technical issues which have stymied progress, and thereby to say much more about each of the six questions. We provide the following answers:
(1) Equilibrium existence and multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes. We construct pure strategy SMPEs for any game with a non-unanimity quota and patient enough players, and also prove (again using constructive arguments) that unanimity games possess pure strategy SMPEs, irrespective of patience. However, we have radically different results on multiplicity for games with and without a unanimity quota. We start with the latter case. Take any point in the policy space at which at least a minimal winning majority have a positive share of the pie. If players are sufficiently patient then we can construct a pure strategy SMPE in which that policy is implemented in the first period and never amended (a property which we call no-delay). By contrast, any game with a unanimity quota has a unique SMPE outcome. 1 The previous literature (which we will survey in the next section) has focused on existence of SMPEs in bargaining games with an evolving default. Our results demonstrate that existence is not a problem when players are patient enough or if there is a unanimity quota.
(2) The size principle. The size principle has been central to the study of legislatures since Riker (1962) . The class of solutions which we construct for non-unanimity games contains SMPEs in which the pie is shared amongst more than a minimal winning coalition.
Our model therefore provides a new explanation for why majorities in legislatures are typically supraminimal.
(3) Waste. Our results on the division of the pie again differ, depending on the quota.
We show that SMPE agreements in games without a unanimity quota typically waste some of the pie when all players are patient enough. Specifically, for every ε > 0, we can construct an SMPE in which a policy which wastes proportion 1 − ε of the pie is agreed to in the first period and never amended. By contrast, none of the pie is wasted in any subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), irrespective of players' patience, in games with a unanimity quota.
More strongly, players can waste any proportion of the pie in SMPEs of nonunanimity games which also fail the size principle. Our model can therefore explain features which are common in pork barrel politics (cf. Evans (2004) ).
(4) Pareto inefficiency. If all players share the same discount factor then Pareto efficiency only turns on whether the entire pie is distributed in every period. With heterogenous discount factors, however, temporal patterns also matter. For instance, our no-delay SMPEs (including those without waste) support policy sequences which can be Pareto improved by operating transfers across periods. More generally, our analysis of SPEs reveals that Pareto inefficiency is not limited to those SMPEs. If preferences are linear in share of the current pie (as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989) ) then, in the generic case where all players have different discount factors, an SPE can be efficient only if it relies on complex, history-dependent punishments. Dynamic equilibria -i.e. those SPEs in which behavior depends (at most) on the list of policies implemented in all previous periods -are all Pareto inefficient. On the other hand, every SPE of a unanimity committee is inefficient if two or more players have different discount factors. The intuition is that some player must eventually earn the entire pie in any efficient policy sequence; 2 and no such policy sequence can be played in any equilibrium.
(5) The Effects of an Endogenous Default. These results stand in sharp contrast to the properties of the Baron-Ferejohn model of an ad hoc committee, in which a single pie is divided. In that model, stationary equilibrium outcomes are unique, only minimal winning coalitions form, and none of the pie is wasted (Baron and Ferejohn (1989) ). 3 These properties clearly carry over to a couple of dynamic variants with exogenous defaults: in one variant, an ad hoc committee agrees once to the divisions of a sequence of pies; in another variant, a standing committee negotiates division of a new pie once it has agreed on division of the existing pie, earning nothing each period till a winning coalition forms. Using those variants as benchmarks, our results imply that default endogeneity has profound implications for standing committees with a nonunanimity quota: Default endogeneity may cause static inefficiency (waste), allow supraminimal coalitions to form, and create a large multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes. None of these properties can hold with a unanimity quota. More strikingly, we show that there is a unique SMPE outcome, which coincides with the unique stationary SPE outcome in the equivalent Baron-Ferejohn model of an ad hoc committee.
2 More impatient players must be served first if at least two players each earn a positive share of some pie.
3 Eraslan (2002) shows that these results extend to games with heterogeneous discount factors and any quota. Specifically: ex post efficiency and the size principle hold when players have strictly concave preferences, but uniqueness and ex ante efficiency might fail (because of random proposers).
As for Pareto inefficiency, the same argument as in our model also applies to the standing committee model with an exogenous default sketched above. By contrast, an ad hoc committee which negotiates over the sequence of pie divisions must reach a Pareto efficient agreement in any equilibrium (because any proposer is a residual claimant). This suggests that efficiency may fail in our model because the committee cannot commit not to renegotiate agreements.
(6) Effect of the quota. Our positive results above reveal that dynamic aspects of standing committees policymaking only matter if the quota is less than unanimity: With a unanimity quota, there is a unique SMPE outcome in which the statically efficient policy reached by an ad hoc committee is implemented immediately and never amended; otherwise, if players are patient enough then there is a multiplicity of pure strategy no-delay SMPEs, some of which are statically inefficient. As for normative results, however, dynamic aspects matter even with a unanimity quota: if discount factors are heterogeneous then all SPEs are Pareto inefficient.
We relate our model and results to the literature in the next section. We present our model in Section 3, and provide results on committees with a non-unanimity and a unanimity quota respectively in Sections 4 and 5. We consider the implications of an endogenous default in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. Most of the proofs appear in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature Baron and Ferejohn (1989) has spawned an enormous literature; we refer readers to Eraslan and McLennan (2011) for a recent list of contributions, including existence and uniqueness results for any quota. The literature on bargaining in standing committees with an endogenous default is much smaller, 4 most likely for technical reasons: in equilibrium, the proposals which would be accepted may vary discontinuously with the default policy because of expectations about future play. The ensuing discontinuous transition probabilities preclude the use of conventional fixed point arguments to establish existence of even mixed strategy equilibria. Moreover, most of this literature has focused on majority rule games, and has therefore not considered the effect of varying the quota. By contrast, this problem is central to our analysis. Kalandrakis (2004) and Baron and Bowen (2013) study majority rule games with three equally patient, risk neutral players, equiprobable proposers, and a statically efficient initial default; Kalandrakis (2010) extends the model to games with five or more players whose preferences are concave. Kalandrakis (2004) and (2010) show that these games have an SMPE in which the default immediately reaches an ergodic distribution where each proposer takes the entire pie; but players mix over extra-equilibrium proposals; Baron and
Bowen construct a no-delay SMPE in which the proposer mixes over her (single) coalition partner. 5 By contrast, we follow Baron and Ferejohn (1989) by supposing that the initial default is statically inefficient, and allowing players to propose policies which waste some of the pie. 6 In the SMPEs which we construct, the default reaches a single policy (immediately), and no player mixes, on or off the path.
Duggan and Kalandrakis (2012) use a fixed point argument to establish existence of pure strategy SMPEs for games in which preferences and the default are subject to stochastic shocks. 7 By contrast, we prove existence in unperturbed games (by and large) using constructive arguments.
Kalandrakis ' (2004) and (2010) equilibria violate the size principle, in the sense that a subminimal winning coalition shares the pie. By contrast, experimental results on continuous allocation problems suggest that conventional violations of the size principle are empirically relevant: 45% of agreed policies were close to the centroid of the simplex. (Some of) our constructed equilibria violate the size principle in this sense, as do the equilibria constructed by Bowen and Zahran (2012) Kalandrakis (2004) [resp. Baron and Bowen (2012) ], indifferent voters always accept [resp. reject]. Indifferent voters respond differently to amendments of policies on and off the equilibrium paths we construct. 6 We show that this is possible in non-unanimity games. On the other hand, it is easy to see that there would still be multiple no-delay equilibrium outcomes if waste were precluded by restricting the policy space.
7 Their results apply to a class of stage games which includes pie division.
not require) strictly concave preferences; 8 but the size principle fails in our construction whenever all players are patient enough. Richter (2013) constructs an egalitarian Markov perfect equilibrium by allowing offers to waste some of the pie. These offers are only made in order to deter deviations from equilibrium play, and are therefore never observed on the path. We also follow Baron and Ferejohn (1989) by allowing for such statically inefficient offers. However, in contrast to
Richter, these offers are made on the equilibrium path in (some of) our constructions. In other words, we explain waste. Baron (1991) argues that Congress often both wastes resources and splits the remainder among a supraminimal majority during distributive bargaining. Baron shows that closed and open rule models based on Baron and Ferejohn (1989) can explain waste (aka pork), but can only explain these violations of the size principle by appealing to a norm of universalism. 9 By contrast, equilibria in our model exhibit both features. Seidmann and Winter (1998) and Okada (2000) , inter alia, study bargaining with an endogenous default in superadditive characteristic function games. 10 Hyndman and Ray (2007) prove that all (including history-dependent) subgame perfect equilibria of characteristic function games are absorbing, and that they are asymptotically statically efficient if there is a finite number of feasible policies. They also show by example that these results do not carry over to games in partition function form. Now simple games are in characteristic function form if and only if the quota is unanimity. We exploit their first result when proving that every equilibrium of a unanimity game is no-delay; their second result also holds in our model (without requiring finiteness). Furthermore, statically inefficient equilibria exist both in our model with a non-unanimity quota and in Hyndman and Ray's model with a partition function form. However, Hyndman and Ray focus on asymptotic static efficiency, and assume a common discount factor; we consider Pareto efficiency and, crucially for associated results, allow discount factors to differ.
Finally, we turn to the no-delay property. Policy outcomes of our no-delay SMPEs can be interpreted as a special case of Acemoglu et al's (2012) "dynamically stable states," which are defined as political states reached in a finite number of periods (and never changed) in 8 As note, their experimental evidence on such games suggests that some subjects have strictly concave preferences. 9 The size principle holds in open rule games if there are enough players. 10 Seidmann and Winter focus on equilibria in which the grand coalition forms after a number of steps.
While we cannot exclude delay with a non-unanimity quota, our constructions all involve no-delay equilibria.
pure strategy SMPEs of bargaining games with an endogenous default and patient players.
Hence, our results characterize and prove existence of a class of dynamically stable states in voting situations where, in contrast to those studied in Acemoglu et al (2012) , the set of policies is infinite and policy preferences are not acyclic. No-delay equilibria are also special cases of Baron and Bowen's (2013) notion of a coalition Markov perfect equilibrium; but the (mixed strategy) equilibria which they construct (for the comparable, basic model) are no-delay.
By definition, the default changes once in a no-delay equilibrium: policy is persistent.
This prediction is consistent with a widespread claim that agencies are never terminated. 11
A related literature explains why statically inefficient policies may be persistent (so the policy sequence is inefficient). However, the mechanisms in this literature rely on privately incurred adjustment costs (Coate and Morris (1999) ), incomplete information (e.g. Mitchell and Moro (2006) ) or the growing power of incumbent factions (Persico et al (2011) ). By contrast, no-delay equilibria are inefficient in our model because relatively impatient players cannot commit to decreasing shares of the pie.
Notation and Definitions

The Standing Committee Game
In each of an infinite number of discrete periods, indexed t = 1, 2, . . ., up to a unit of a divisible resource -the "pie" -can be allocated among the members of a committee N ≡ {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2. Thus, the set of feasible policies each period is
We denote the policy implemented in period t, and therefore the default at the begin-
. At the start of each period t, player i is selected with probability p i ∈ (0, 1) to propose a policy in X. We say that a player who proposes the existing default passes. All players then simultaneously vote to accept or to reject the chosen proposal. The voting rule used in every period t is a quota q which satisfies n/2 < q ≤ n. Specifically, if at least q players accept proposal y ∈ X then it is implemented as the committee decision in period t and becomes the default next period (i.e.
x t = y); and if y secures less than q votes then the previous default, x t−1 , is implemented 11 See Kaufman (1976) for the conventional claim, and Lewis (2002) for a dissenting view.
again and becomes the default in period t + 1 (i.e. x t = x t−1 ). The default in period 1 is x 0 = (0, . . . , 0). (Our main results do not depend on which policy in X is the (exogenous) initial default.) We will refer to
such that every x t is feasible as a policy sequence.
Once policy x t has been implemented, every player i receives an instantaneous payoff
, where u i is a strictly increasing, continuously differentiable concave utility function, and δ i ∈ (0, 1) is i's discount factor. Thus, player i's payoff from a policy sequence
. We say that discount factors are heterogeneous if δ i ̸ = δ j for some pair of players i and j; and that discount factors are strictly heterogeneous if δ i ̸ = δ j for every pair of players i and j.
The assumptions above define a dynamic game, which we will refer to as a standing committee game. Our main purpose is to analyze the equilibria of this game.
Equilibrium and Efficiency
Equilibrium concept. We follow the standard approach of concentrating throughout on stage-undominated subgame perfect equilibria (SPEs); i.e., SPEs in which, at any voting stage, no player uses a weakly dominated strategy. This excludes strategy combinations in which players all vote one way, and are indifferent when q < n because they are nonpivotal. Henceforth, we leave it as understood that any reference to "equilibria" is to equilibria that satisfy this property. For our positive analysis, we will in addition concentrate (as the previous literature) on the stricter criterion of stationary Markov perfect equilibria (SMPEs), i.e., SPEs in which all players use strategies which only depend on the current payoff-relevant relevant state: in proposal stages, players' choices (of probability distributions over X) only depend on the ongoing default; in voting stages, players' choices (of probability distributions over {accept , reject}) only depend on the current default and the proposal just made. We will be particularly interested in pure strategy SMPEs, where every player's choice is deterministic after every history.
Absorbing points and no-delay strategies. A history at any stage of the game describes all that has transpired in the previous periods and stages (the sequence of proposers, their respective proposals and the associated pattern of votes). Of particular interest are "implementation histories" (to use the language of Hyndman and Ray (2007) ), i.e., those at which a policy is about to be implemented. For each x ∈ X, the set of implementation histories at which policy x is about to be implemented is denoted by H x . Let H ≡ ∪ x∈X H x be the set of all possible implementation histories.
Every strategy profile σ (in conjunction with recognition probabilities) generates a transition function P σ on implementation histories, where P σ (h, H ′ ) is the probability (given σ) that the next period's implementation history is in H ′ , given that the implementation history for the current period is h. Thus, for all i ∈ N , all x ∈ X and all h ∈ H x , player i's continuation value at h is given by
We say that x ∈ X is an absorbing point of σ if and only if
and denote by
the set of absorbing points of σ. We will say that σ is no-delay if and only if:
and (ii) for all h ∈ H, there is x ∈ A(σ) such that h ∈ H x . In words, a strategy profile is no-delay if the committee implements an absorbing point at any implementation history (including those off the equilibrium path).
In the case of stationary Markov strategies, we will indulge in a slight abuse of notation and replace implementation histories by policies in the definitions above. For instance, P σ (x, Y ) will denote the probability (given stationary Markov strategy σ) that the committee chooses a policy in Y in the next period given that policy x is implemented in the current period -so that A(σ) ≡ {x ∈ X : P σ (x, {x}) = 1}.
(In)efficiency. It is instructive to distinguish between two notions of inefficiency. First, policy x ∈ X is statically inefficient if ∑ i∈N x i < 1; we will refer to 1 − ∑ i∈N x i as waste. 12 Second, σ is Pareto inefficient if the vector of payoffs it generates is Pareto dominated by the infinite-horizon payoff arising from some (possibly stochastic) policy sequence in X. Evidently, every equilibrium inducing a policy sequence which contains a statically inefficient policy is Pareto inefficient, but the converse is false.
Nonunanimity Committees
Let W be the collection of winning coalitions: W ≡ {C ⊆ N : |S| ≥ q}. Throughout this section, we assume that q < n: agreement requires less than unanimous consent.
12 Recall that ui(.) is strictly increasing in xi.
Simple Solutions
We will construct a class of pure strategy no-delay SMPEs, in which each player j ∈ N is only offered two different shares of the pie -a "high" offer x j > 0 and a "low" offer y j < x j -after any history. In every period and for any ongoing default, each proposer i (conditional on being recognized to make an offer) implicitly selects a winning coalition C i ∋ i by making high offers to the members of C i and low offers to the members of N \ C i .
If each player receives a low offer from at least one proposer, then we refer to the set of such proposals (one for each player) as a simple solution. Formally:
where
Before we turn our attention to the construction of equilibria themselves, a few remarks are in order about simple solutions:
1. A simple solution exists if and only if q < n: if q < n then the main simple solution, in which the pie is divided equally among every minimal winning coalition, is a notable example of a simple solution (cf. Wilson (1971) ); if q = n then each player must be included in the unique winning coalition N and, therefore, there is no simple solution.
2. If q < n then any policy which assigns a positive share to at least q players is part of some simple solution. To see this, take an arbitrary policy z ∈ X such that |{i : z i > 0}| ≥ q. For expositional convenience, we order the players in N in such a way that z i ≥ z i+1 for each i = 1, . . . , n − 1 (thus ensuring that z i > 0 for all i ≤ q).
Consider the simple solution induced by (C, x, y) , where
, ε > 0 arbitrarily small, and C i is the coalition that includes i and the next q − 1 players following the order 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, n, 1, 2, . . . , q − 1. It is readily checked that (C, x, y) satisfies all the conditions of Definition 1 (in particular y i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N ), and that
3. The definition of the class C of coalitions does not require all of them to be distinct;
but it is easy to confirm that C must contain at least n/(n − q) distinct coalitions.
4. The policies in a simple solution may all assign a positive share to a supraminimal coalition, and might all involve waste.
5. Policies which assign a positive share to fewer than a minimal winning coalition cannot be included in a simple solution. Such policies include the initial default and the vertices of the simplex.
Preliminary Intuitions
If all players are myopic then there is a unique SPE in which each proposer successfully claims the entire pie. More generally, it is easy to show that there is no absorbing SPE when players' discount factors are small. Indeed, owing to the emptiness of the core, there is always a winning coalition which can make all its (short-sighted) members strictly better off by amending any potential absorbing point to another policy in X. For future reference, we record this observation as: 13 Nevertheless, we will show that it is possible to construct a no-delay (and therefore absorbing) SMPE when players' discount factors are sufficiently large. The following example illustrates Definition 1, and provides an intuitive presentation of some key mechanisms behind our equilibrium construction. Take, for example, the simple solution S = {(1/3, 1/3, 1/6), (1/6, 1/3, 1/3), (1/3, 1/6, 1/3)} -that is, C 1 = {1, 2}, C 2 = {2, 3}, C 3 = {1, 3} and x j = 1/3, y j = 1/6 for every player 13 A formal proof is available upon request. 14 These are precisely the assumptions made by Kalandrakis (2004) . In contrast to that paper, however, we require the initial default to be (0, . . . , 0), and allow for policies which do not exhaust the pie. j = 1, 2, 3. If δ ≥ 12/13 then the following strategy profile forms a pure strategy, no-delay SMPE whose set of absorbing points is S:
• Player i always offers 1/3 to the players in C i and 1/6 to the player outside C i if the ongoing default does not belong to S, and passes otherwise;
• Player i accepts proposal z when the ongoing default is w if and only if one of the following conditions holds: (i) w ∈ S and w i = 1/6; (ii) w / ∈ S, z ∈ S, and
A formal proof of this statement is obtained as a special case of Theorem 1. The intuition is as follows. It is readily checked that this (pure) strategy profile is no-delay and that S is the set of absorbing points: each policy x C i in S is proposed by player i with probability 1/3, accepted by the two members of majority coalition C i , and never amended.
To see why this is an SMPE, observe first that each (patient) player i = 1, 2, 3 can only end up in two possible states in the long-run: a "good state" in which she receives 1/3 in all periods, and a "bad state" in which she receives 1/6 in all periods. Indeed, any ongoing default w is either an absorbing point itself or will lead immediately to some absorbing
∈ {1/6, 1/3}. In the former case, player i's expected payoff is
, and w i = 1/6 otherwise. In the latter case, i receives w i in the current period and 2/3 × 1/3 + 1/3 × 1/6 = 5/18 in the next period (i ∈ C j with probability 2/3). Her expected payoff is therefore (1 − δ)w i + (5δ/18), which is less than 1/3 for all
Thus, every player i seeks to maximize (resp. minimize) the probability of ending up in a good (resp. bad) state. In voting stages, this includes rejecting any proposal to change a default policy x C j with C j ∋ i to another policy y (even if y Pareto dominates
being in a good state, i would not run the risk of ending up in a bad state. It also includes accepting any proposal x C j with C j ∋ i when the ongoing default is not already a good state for i. As the C j 's are winning coalitions, these observations imply that any attempt to change a default in S would be unsuccessful, and that any proposal to change a default outside S to a policy in S would be successful. In proposal stages, it is therefore optimal for player i to propose x C i if the ongoing default is not an absorbing point, and to pass otherwise.
This example illustrates why our results are radically different from those obtained in the standard Baron-Ferejohn model of an ad hoc committee. In particular, it explains why shares of the pie can be perpetually wasted in equilibrium: any deviation to proposing a Pareto-superior policy would be rejected, as policy would revert to one of the statically inefficient absorbing points. It also shows that the pie can be shared amongst more than a minimal winning coalition in equilibrium.
Positive Results
Our first result generalizes the argument above to any nonunanimity quota, any concave utility functions, and any simple solution. We describe a pure strategy no-delay SMPE in which each policy in a simple solution is proposed by some player, and no other policy is proposed as a simple equilibrium.
Theorem 1. Suppose that q < n, and let S be a simple solution. There existsδ ∈ (0, 1)
such that the following is true whenever min i∈N δ i ≥δ: There exists a pure-strategy nodelay SMPE whose set of absorbing points is S.
The proof of this theorem, like those of all other theorems in the paper, is provided in the Appendix. Theorem 1 has several interesting implications:
Multiplicity of SMPE outcomes. We noted above that any policy (say, z) which assigns a positive share to q or more players is part of a simple solution. Theorem 1 therefore implies that z is an absorbing point of an SMPE of any game with q < n and patient enough players. In that SMPE, player 1 proposes z which is accepted by all members of coalition C 1 = {1, . . . , q} ∈ W, and never amended.
This argument does not apply to policies which assign a positive share to fewer than q players (including the initial default), and can therefore not be part of a simple solution.
Policies which assign a zero share to some winning coalition cannot be absorbing points because every member of such a coalition could profitably deviate as a proposer. 15
Minimal winning coalitions. The Baron-Ferejohn model predicts that only minimal winning coalitions share the pie in any stationary SPE. Theorem 1 immediately implies that this property, often referred to as the size principle, may fail in our model with an 15 As Kalandrakis (2004 Kalandrakis ( , 2010 demonstrates, such policies could nevertheless be part of an ergodic set.
evolving default: As mentioned earlier, policies in a simple solution may all assign a positive share to a supraminimal coalition.
Waste. Another important implication of Theorem 1 is that endogeneity of the default may create substantial (static) inefficiencies in equilibrium. For any ε ∈ (0, 1), let X ε be the set of policies such that the committee "wastes" more than 1 − ε:
It is easy to find simple solutions that are subsets of X ε . For instance, take the simple solution induced by (C, x, y) where, for each i ∈ N , x i = ε/2q, y i = 0, and C i is the coalition that includes i and the next q − 1 players following the order 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, n, 1, 2, . . . , q − 1. Theorem 1 implies that any non-unanimity game with patient enough players has a pure-strategy no-delay SMPE whose absorbing points all belong to X ε : the committee wastes at least 1 − ε in every period along the equilibrium path. This again stands in sharp contrast to the stationary SPEs of the Baron-Ferejohn model, in which waste never occurs.
Agreements may in fact be even worse relative to the initial default than our presentation has hitherto suggested. Specifically, the proof of Theorem 1 does not rely on our supposition that x 0 = (0, . . . , 0); so we can construct simple equilibria in which every absorbing policy is strictly Pareto-dominated by the initial default (by appropriately selecting
Theorem 1 also implies that there are SMPEs in which statically inefficient policies are retained indefinitely. This property is empirically interesting: for example, Brainard and Verdier (1997) describe persistent protection as "one of the central stylized facts in trade" (p222). Theorem 1 therefore contributes to the literature on policy persistence, without requiring (as in Coate and Morris (1999) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) ) that players can unilaterally invest in sustaining policies.
Pork barrel politics. We have noted that SMPE agreements may waste some of the pie and that the size principle may fail. Theorem 1 says that both properties can hold in the same equilibrium. According to Schattschneider (1935) , this combination of properties characterized US trade policy before 1934. Indeed, Baron (1991) claims that legislation 16 This property is stronger than a related result in Bernheim et al's (2006) and Anesi and Seidmann's (forthcoming) models of bargaining with an evolving default: that the equilibrium agreement is worse than x 0 for some winning coalition.
on distributive issues often exhibits this combination. 17 He also argues that models of ad hoc committees can explain pork, but not violations of the size principle. By contrast, Theorem 1 implies that equilibrium agreements in a standing committee may satisfy both properties without appealing to a norm of universalism.
We record the observations above as 
Pareto Efficiency
Corollary 1(ii) implies that some simple equilibria are statically efficient. If players have a common discount factor then these equilibria are also Pareto efficient; but wasting some of the pie is not the only possible kind of inefficiency in dynamic models when discount factors are heterogeneous. Our aim in this subsection is to demonstrate that a large class Baron and Ferejohn (1989) , and much of the ensuing literature.)
The argument for Theorem 2 is easiest to see when the equilibria are no-delay (like simple equilibria). As discount factors are strictly heterogeneous, efficiency requires either that one player always earns the entire pie or front loading the shares of less patient players, and eventually assigning the entire pie to the most patient player. Neither is possible in equilibrium.
In contrast to Theorem 1, the premise of Theorem 2 does not require that players be patient enough. It only requires strict heterogeneity. It is easy to confirm that the argument works as long as enough players have different discount factors.
It is easy to confirm that Theorem 2 also holds when every u i is strictly concave and differentiable. To see this, note that efficiency then requires that the path be deterministic and statically efficient. The most impatient player to ever receive a positive share (say, i) must receive a strictly decreasing share on any efficient path. (This follows from simple exploitation of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions associated with the Pareto optimality problem.)
No such path could be played in equilibrium because player i could profitably deviate qua proposer by passing, thereby delaying the decrease in its share. On the other hand, there cannot be an equilibrium in which the most patient receives the entire pie each period, as another player could profitably deviate to proposing a policy which gives her a positive share.
Unanimity Committees
This section examines equilibria of standing committee games in which agreement requires unanimous consent: that is, q = n.
Preliminary Example
As in the previous section, we begin with a simple example that will provide some intuition for the general results that follow.
Example 1 Continued. Consider a variant on Example 1 (of Section 4.2) in which the default can only be changed if all three players accept a proposal: that is, q = n = 3.
The other primitives of the example remain the same:
for all i ∈ N . We will construct a no-delay equilibrium σ in which, at any default x ∈ X, the selected proposer (say i) successfully offers the committee a policy x + s i (x) ∈ ∆ n−1 .
We can think of proposer i offering to share the amount of pie not distributed yet -i.e.
1 − (x 1 + x 2 + x 3 ) -with the other players, with s i j (x) being the (extra) share offered by proposer i to player j. 19 In such a situation, proposer i's optimal offer to player j, x j +s i j (x), must leave the latter indifferent between accepting and rejecting. If j rejected i's offer, she would receive her payoff from the ongoing default in the current period, (1 − δ)x j , and would then receive offer x j + s k j (x) from each proposer k = 1, 2, 3 with probability 1/3 in the next period. The following condition must therefore hold:
for each i and j ̸ = i. Given the shares of the pie offered to the other committee members,
proposer i receives the residual:
Combining (1) and (2), we obtain the policy x+s i (x) (absorbing point) successfully offered by each player i at any default x ∈ X:
In particular, each player expects to earn 1/3 in the game itself:
Its simplicity notwithstanding, there are two noteworthy features of this example. First, the set of absorbing points of the no-delay SMPE σ coincides with the unit simplex:
for all x ∈ X and all i, j ∈ N . Second, the SMPE outcome coincides with that of the analogous Baron-Ferejohn model with a unanimity quota. As the rest of this section will demonstrate, these properties do not rely on our parametric assumptions.
Positive Results
The main results of this section hinge on the following lemma, which generalizes the properties of Example 1 above to SPEs.
Lemma 1. If q = n then every SPE σ is a pure strategy no-delay SPE with
Thus, under unanimity rule, a standing committee selects an absorbing point in the simplex immediately at any ongoing default. In contrast to non-unanimity committees, therefore, waste never occurs in an equilibrium of unanimity committee games. In other words, the unanimity game has and only has no-delay, statically efficient SPEs.
The argument for Lemma 1 repeatedly exploits a monotonicity property of SPE value functions (which depend on features of the history other than the state): players cannot be punished for deviating without their consent. This property does not rely on stationarity, and therefore applies to all SPEs. This monotonicity condition will allow us to exploit Hyndman and Ray (2007) Proposition 1, which implies (in our model) that the equilibrium default converges almost surely. By contrast, even SMPE value functions need not be monotonic, absent unanimity; so SMPEs can be statically inefficient when q < n.
Our next result asserts existence of a pure strategy no-delay equilibrium in which resources are never wasted. The premise of Theorem 3 differs from the premise of Theorem 1 (our analogous result for q < n) in two important respects. First, we no longer require that players be patient enough. Second, Theorem 3 asserts that the policies reached from any default (including the initial default) are statically efficient. The latter property also hold in the standard Baron-Ferejohn model with a unanimity quota Duggan (2000, 2006) ). The second part of the theorem strengthens the analog between equilibrium play in our game and in Baron and Ferejohn (1989) . In contrast to nonunanimity games (recall Observation 1), a no-delay equilibrium exists in unanimity games even when discount factors are small. We prove Theorem 3(i) using a construction which generalizes that employed in Example 1 above: A fixed point argument is used to show that there are proposals for each player which move the default into the simplex and make every respondent indifferent between accepting and rejecting, given that defaults in the simplex would not be amended; and that no player can profitably deviate from proposing such policies or accepting such an offer.
The proof of Theorem 3(ii) establishes that pure-strategy stationary equilibrium outcomes in standing and ad hoc committee games coincide. The result then follows from Merlo and Wilson (1995) Theorem 2, which shows that Baron and Ferejohn's (1989) model of an ad hoc committee has a unique equilibrium outcome when q = n.
In the Introduction, we asked how play in standing and ad hoc committees differs.
Our results in the last section entail a significant contrast across stationary equilibrium outcomes in the two games when q < n. Theorem 3(ii) implies that this contrast does not carry over to games with a unanimity quota.
Pareto efficiency
Theorem 2 states that every dynamic equilibrium of a non-unanimity game with linear preferences is inefficient if discount factors are strictly heterogeneous. Pareto efficiency then requires that some player eventually gets the entire pie: which is impossible in equilibrium.
In addition, Corollary 1(ii) states that there are no-delay, statically inefficient equilibria.
If q = n then waste is impossible in any SPE (by Lemma 1). However, the inefficiency result carries over, this time to every SPE. In contrast to Theorem 2, the premise of Theorem 4 does not require linear preferences, and weakens strict heterogeneity to heterogeneity. We obtain this stronger result because the SPEs of a unanimity game are no-delay (Lemma 1). This extra structure allows us to prove inefficiency by constructing a Pareto-improving policy sequence.
The Effects of an Endogenous Default
The analysis in the previous sections has revealed important differences between our standing committee game and Baron and Ferejohn's (1989) static game with an ad hoc committee. The comparison is directly relevant to committees like the Supreme Court, whose application of the stare decisis rule determines whether a decision can be amended. If the rule is strictly applied then the first decision establishes a precedent: the Court can then not revisit a case it has already decided (as in Baron-Ferejohn) . By contrast, previous decisions only govern lower court rulings until amended if stare decisis is inoperative. 20 In this section, we compare equilibrium outcomes in our dynamic model with dynamic variants of the Baron-Ferejohn model in which a committee decides on then policy implemented in an infinite sequence of periods. (We will return to the Supreme Court example in the next section.) We focus on two such models:
• Ad hoc committee with commitment ability. In this variant, the game ends once the committee has agreed to a single "policy"; but in contrast to the standard Baron-Ferejohn model, a policy specifies the way in which a sequence of pies will be divided.
• Standing committee with an exogenous default. In this variant, the committee negotiates over division of a single pie each period. Once an agreement is reached, players earn utility from their share of the pie, and the committee starts to negotiate division of another pie.
The initial default for the new negotiations is exogenously fixed as the n-vector (0, ..., 0).
Stationary equilibria of both models clearly share a couple of properties with Baron and Ferejohn's (1989) static model: Each pie is shared by a minimal winning coalition of players; and each pie is fully shared -there is no waste. The argument for standing committees 20 The two models naturally capture other aspects of the Court: justices bargain before voting on each case. Furthermore, life tenure stabilizes membership of the Court, who may be particularly patient.
with an exogenous default corresponds to that used to derive equilibria in the conventional Baron-Ferejohn model: for stationarity precludes conditioning the current division on the history up to the current period. 21 Conventional arguments also entail these properties for an ad hoc committee with commitment ability, where the same coalition shares the pie in every period. However, the sequence of policies agreed by the two committees in equilibrium differ when discount factors are heterogeneous. In particular, an ad hoc committee with commitment ability must agree to a Pareto-efficient sequence of policies, as any proposer is a residual claimant of every pie.
These observations can serve as benchmarks with which to compare the results of the previous sections. Some notable differences can be observed:
(i) Substantial shares of the pie can be indefinitely wasted and the size principle may fail in nonunanimity standing committees with an endogenous default, whereas waste never occurs and only minimal winning coalitions form in committees with an exogenous default.
Thus, while models with an exogenous default can explain pork but not violations of the size principle, agreements in a standing committee with an endogenous default may possess both properties. Interestingly, default endogeneity does not generate waste when the quota is unanimity.
(ii) Equilibrium play in the standing committee game is Pareto inefficient when discount factors are strictly heterogeneous and preferences are linear. Theorem 2 also applies to standing committees with an exogenous default, as stationarity requires repetition of the same expected payoff. As mentioned above, however, ad hoc committees with commitment ability reach Pareto-efficient agreements in every equilibrium. The key difference from our model is that an ad hoc committee with commitment ability cannot renegotiate an agreement. Viewed in this light, our model demonstrates that equilibrium play in a standing committee with an endogenous default is generically inefficient because players cannot commit not to renegotiate the existing agreement.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has identified a class of pure strategy (stationary Markov perfect) equilibria for pie-division bargaining games with an endogenous default and patient enough players, which supplements existing constructions. This has allowed us to provide a number of predictions about decision making in standing committees, and to identify important 21 Indeed, the equilibrium is no-delay and unique.
implications of an endogenous default. In addition, the identified equilibria to the standing committee game have a no-delay property: the first policy proposal is accepted and remains in place in all future periods. Duggan (2000, 2006) have generalized the standard model of bargaining in ad hoc committees to include any convex set of policies as well as purely distributional policies, and established existence of a (mixed-strategy) stationary SPE. Before concluding, a similar extension of our model of bargaining in standing committees to more general policy spaces is worth discussing.
Our positive results for non-unanimity games relied on the existence of simple solutions.
Though the definition of a simple solution needs to be extended to this more general setting, the logic behind this extension remains the same as for Definition 1. Each player i can be in two possible states: a "good state," in which she has a high utility u i , or a "bad state," in which she has a low utility v i . Each proposer i selects a policy x C i which gives all members of winning coalition C i their high utility, and gives the other players their low utility. Put differently, each proposer i selects the coalition C i of players who will be in a good state. Figure 1 provides an example in the standard spatial model: n = 3; q = 2; X is a nonempty, compact and convex subset of R 2 ; and u i (x) = − ∥x −x i ∥ for all x ∈ X and all i ∈ N , wherex i ∈ X stands for the ideal policy of player i. Baron and Herron (2003) use computational methods to study this setting in a finite-horizon version of our standing committee game. Given their results, Baron and Herron conjecture that proposals are always statically efficient in the infinite horizon case; and that proposals are closer to the centroid of the shaded triangle in Figure 1 , the more patient are players, and the longer is the horizon. The example in Figure 1 disproves their conjecture: The set of policies Figure 1 constitutes a simple solution and, therefore, the set of absorbing points of some pure-strategy no-delay SMPE whenever players are sufficiently patient. (The arguments used to prove Theorem 1 still apply.) This equilibrium is both statically and Pareto inefficient: all the policies in S lie outside the static Pareto set (the grey triangle in Figure 1 ) and all players would be strictly better off if the expected policy ∑ i p i x C i were agreed immediately and never amended. This is in accord with our findings for the distributive setting.
These remarks suggest that our results may be applicable to committees like the Supreme Court, whose policy space is (arguably) more naturally thought of as spatial than as divisions of a pie. The literature on precedent in constitutional law has considered how stare decisis affects the trade-off between predictability of the law and the risk of error: 22 stare decisis forces predictability; and the literature supposes that a divided Court would otherwise regularly overturn precedent. 23 We have argued above that a Court which operates according to strict stare decisis is equivalent to a Baron-Ferejohn ad hoc committee, whereas our model represents a Court which does not recognize precedent; and have suggested that the justices are typically patient. Our results then provide two contributions to the literature. First, our construction of no-delay SMPEs when players are patient suggests that the law may well be stable, even if precedent is not recognized. 24 Second, our comparison of Baron-Ferejohn with our model suggests that stare decisis may prevent the Court from reaching (statically) inefficient decisions.
Having discussed how simple solutions may exist with different policy spaces, we should 22 Relevant papers include Schauer (1987) , Stone (1988) , Waldron (2012) and Kozel (forthcoming) . 23 The literature has typically treated the Court as a unitary body. However, Barrett (2013) Baron (1996) and Banks and Duggan (2006))).
We now turn to unanimity games. We showed in the last section that, in distributive settings, the same policies can be implemented in our model as in models of standing committees with an exogenous default. Indeed, a brief inspection of the proof of Theorem 3(ii) reveals that it does not rely on the restriction to pie-division problems. Hence, when q = n, the equilibrium outcomes of the extended standing committee game are also stationary SPE outcomes of the related ad hoc committee game. Whether the converse is also true, however, remains an open question. Indeed, the monotonicity condition used to establish Theorem 3(ii) (cf. Lemma 2(i) in the Appendix) still holds but is insufficient to prove that optimal proposals in the standing committee game are also optimal in standing committee games with an exogenous default (given the same voting behavior).
Appendix A Proofs of the Theorems and Lemmata
Theorem 1. Suppose that q < n, and let S be a simple solution. There existsδ ∈ (0, 1) such that the following is true whenever min i∈N δ i ≥δ: There exists a pure-strategy nodelay SMPE whose set of absorbing points is S.
Our goal is to construct a pure-strategy stationary Markov strategy σ such that A(σ) = S, and then to show that σ is a no-delay SPE when min i∈N δ i exceeds some threshold δ ∈ (0, 1).
We begin by definingδ. Let p min be the minimal probability of recognition among the 25 We refer the reader to Ordeshook (1986, Chapter 9) for an in-depth discussion.
members of the committee: p min ≡ min i∈N p i . For each player i ∈ N , define the threshold
The thresholdδ is defined asδ ≡ max i∈Nδi .
We henceforth assume that min i∈N δ i ≥δ.
We now turn to the construction of strategy profile σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ). For each i ∈ N , define the function ϕ i : X → S as follows: (1) 
) .
Observe that σ is a pure strategy stationary Markov strategy profile. We will now prove that σ is a no-delay, stage-undominated SPE in a number of steps.
Claim 1: The collection of functions
( ϕ i ) i∈N
satisfies the following inequality for all
i ∈ N and w / ∈ S:
Proof: Consider any player i ∈ N and any policy x / ∈ S. By definition of the ϕ j 's, we
26 Recall that proposing the default w is interpreted as passing.
where the last inequality follows from δ i ≥δ ≥δ i .
Claim 2: σ is no-delay with A(σ) = S; and, for all w ∈ X and i ∈ N ,
in the next period, player j is selected to make a proposal with probability p j . From the definition of proposal strategies, she proposes z = ϕ j (w). As z ∈ S, proposal strategies prescribe all proposers to pass when the default is z: ϕ j (z) = z for all j ∈ N . This implies that z would be implemented in all future periods if it were voted up in the next period.
From part (b) in the definition of voting strategies, this implies that j's proposal is voted up (and never amended): each member i of C j ∈ W is offered z i = x i and
(where the inequality is obtained from Claim 1). Hence, player i's expected continuation value from the next period on is
) . This proves that (3) holds and
Now suppose that w ∈ S is implemented. From the definition of proposal strategies, all proposers pass in future periods -i.e. w i = ϕ j i (w) for all i, j ∈ N -so that i's continuation value is u i (w i ). This implies that
and P σ (w, S) = 1 for all w ∈ S. A(σ) = S then follows from P σ (w, S) = 1 for all w ∈ X. Suppose that w ∈ S -so V σ i (w) = u i (w i ). We must prove that part (a) in the definition of voting strategies prescribes i to accept only if V σ i (z) ≥ V σ i (w), and to reject only if
Claim 3: Given default w and proposal z, each voter i ∈ N accepts only if V
To do so, we distinguish between two different cases:
• Case 2: z / ∈ S. In this case, if i accepts then w i = y i . As δ i ≥δ ≥δ i ,
If i rejects then w i = x i . Claim 1 then implies that
Claim 4: There is no profitable one-shot deviation from σ in the proposal stage of any period.
Proof: Suppose, first, that the current default w is an element of S. Passing is evidently an optimal action for the selected proposer, for part (a) in the definition of voting strategies implies that members of some winning coalition -i.e. those voters j who receive w j = x j -would reject any proposal in X.
Now suppose that w / ∈ S. If proposer i followed the prescription of σ i then her proposal would be accepted (Claim 2) and her payoff would be u i (x i ) (which is the highest payoff she can obtain by making a proposal in S). She must therefore propose a policy z / ∈ S if she is to profitably deviate from σ i . By Claim 1, however, we have
for all z / ∈ S. This proves that no proposer has a profitable one-shot deviation from σ.
Combining Claims 1-4, we obtain Theorem 1.
Proof: We assume without loss of generality that δ i < δ i+1 for each i = 1, . . . , n − 1. Now suppose, contrary to the statement of Theorem 2, that an efficient dynamic equilibrium σ exists. Let u t i denote player i's expected period-t payoff in this equilibrium. To obtain the desired contradiction, we first need to establish the following results: Claim 1: Take any i ∈ N . If u t i > 0 for some t ∈ N then u τ j = 0 for all j < i and all τ > t.
Proof. To see this, suppose instead that u t i > 0 and that u τ j > 0 for some j < i and some τ > t. This implies that there is a feasible marginal utility transfer du t j from player i to player j in period t, and a feasible marginal utility transfer du τ j from player j to player i in period τ . In particular, consider transfers that would leave player j indifferent; that is:
As σ cannot be Pareto improved, this implies that δ
Claim 2: For any i ∈ N and any t ∈ N, there exists τ > t such that u τ i < 1.
Proof. Suppose that, contrary to Claim 2, there exist i ∈ N and t ∈ N such that u τ i = 1 for all τ > t -so that u τ l = 0 for all l ̸ = i and all τ > t. Now consider a potential deviation by player j ̸ = i in some period τ following some "policy history" (
She proposes (1/n, . . . , 1/n) whenever selected as proposer. This proposal must be rejected by at least one member of N \ {i} -say k -and, following the new policy history
, player j must receive 0 in all future periods; otherwise the deviation would be profitable and, consequently, σ would not be an SPE.
Sequential rationality therefore implies that k's expected payoff following policy history (
must be strictly positive. But this in turn implies that if k is recognized to make a proposal at policy history ( x 1 , . . . , x τ −1 ) (which occurs with probability p k > 0), then she can profitably deviate from σ by passing (or, equivalently, proposing the current default x τ −1 ). This would indeed yield policy history (
and, from the previous discussion, yield her a positive payoff. This contradicts σ being an SPE.
Claim 1 implies that, in the efficient equilibrium σ, if u t n > 0 in some period t then u τ j = 0 for all j ̸ = n and all τ > t. But we know from Claim 2 that this is impossible. Consequently, u t n = 0 for every period t in an efficient equilibrium. We can now proceed inductively by applying the same argument to each player i < n until we reach the conclusion that u t i = 0 for all i and all t -which is evidently impossible in an SPE.
Lemma 1. If q = n then every SPE σ is a pure strategy no-delay SPE with A(σ) = ∆ n−1 .
Proof: Recall that we use h t to denote a typical "implementation history" -i.e.
those just before the implementation of a new policy -and
to denote player i's continuation value at this history. For each x ∈ X, let H x be the set of implementation histories at which x is about to be implemented.
The proof of Lemma 1 hinges on the following lemmata.
Lemma 2. Suppose that q = n, and let σ be an SPE. For every i ∈ N and every history h t at which x ∈ X is about to be implemented, we have
Proof: (i) This is an immediate consequence of the unanimity rule. If
for some realization of h t+1 , then player i could profitably deviate from σ by rejecting (and therefore preventing) any amendment of x leading to h t+1 .
(ii) As
. This implies that
which is obviously impossible.
Proof: It is easy to see that A(σ) ̸ = ∅ (for instance, take policy (1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ ∆ n−1 ).
Let σ be an SPE and suppose, contrary to the statement of the result, that there exists
for any history h ′ ∈ H y -the second inequality follows from Lemma 2(ii). This implies that, at any history following h, any proposer could profitably deviate by (successfully)
proposing to amend x to y.
♢
At this point, we need some notation. Any strategy profile σ = (σ i ) i∈N induces a stochastic process {x t } on the policy space, where the random variablex t stands for the policy implemented in period t. For any period-t implementation history h t and any m ∈ N, we can define a random variablex m (h t ), which describes the policy implemented in period
, where E [·] is the expectation operator with respect to the stochastic process engendered by σ.
Lemma 1 is obtained from the following lemmata: Lemmata 4 and 5 show that a policy in ∆ n−1 must be implemented at any implementation history under σ; Lemma 6 shows
Lemma 4. If σ is an SPE then the following statements are true for all x ∈ X and all
(ii) For every i ∈ N , we have
Proof: Take an arbitrary x ∈ X and an arbitrary h ∈ H x .
(i) By Proposition 1 in Hyndman and Ray (2007) , the stochastic sequence
)) i∈N converges almost surely to a limit. 27 As the u i 's are strictly increasing functions, the stochastic sequence of policies (x m (h t ) ) converges along any sample path for which
converges almost surely to a limitx(h t ).
(ii) The first inequality in (4) is an immediate implication of Lemma 2(i).
To complete the proof of the lemma, therefore, it remains to establish that
for all all i ∈ N . To do so, observe first that Lemma 2(iii) (applied recursively) im-
for all m ∈ N. Now suppose that, contrary to our assertion,
As (x m (x)) converges almost surely to a limitx(h t ), Lebesgue's Dominated Convergence
. This in turn implies that there
for all m > M . This contradicts our initial observation that
for all m ∈ N.
♢ Lemma 5. If σ is an SPE then, in every period, the committee implements a policy in
Proof: For any w ∈ X and any h ∈ H w , define policy
As the u i 's are concave, Jensen's inequality implies that
for all i ∈ N . Now suppose, contrary to the statement of the lemma, that there is some implementation history h such that the committee implements x / ∈ ∆ n−1 . Using (6) and Lemma 4(ii), we obtain
which implies that y i (h) ≥ x i for all i ∈ N . Consequently, there must be some y ∈ ∆ n−1 such that y i ≥ y i (h) ≥ x i for all i ∈ N . Moreover, as x / ∈ ∆ n−1 and y ∈ ∆ n−1 , there must be a nonempty subset of players, say W , such that y i > x i for all i ∈ W .
If W = N then every player who proposes x could profitably deviate by proposing y instead, as (7) implies that
for all i ∈ N and all h ′ ∈ H y (where the last inequality follows from Lemma 2(i)).
If W ⊂ N then the (strict) inequality above still holds for the members of W : V σ i (h) < u i (y i ) for every i ∈ W . Let z(ε) ∈ X be the policy defined as
As the u i 's are continuous and strictly increasing, there exists a sufficiently small ε > 0 H z(ε) . By the same argument as above, every player who proposes x could profitably deviate by proposing z(ε) instead.
♢
We already know from Lemma 3 that A(σ) ⊆ ∆ n−1 . To complete the proof of the Lemma, we must show that every point in the unit simplex is absorbing.
Proof: Let x ∈ ∆ n−1 and suppose, contrary to the lemma, that there is a history at which x is amended to some x ′ ̸ = x with positive probability. From the previous lemma, we
, and therefore, that
for every i ∈ N and all h t ∈ H x ′ . Hence, at implementation history h t ∈ H x ′ where the current default x is about to be amended to x ′ ,
for all i ∈ N (where the inequality follows from Lemma 2(i)). As x is by assumption an element of the simplex, the inequality above implies that x ′ = x, thus yielding the desired contradiction.
Finally, σ must be a pure strategy profile. Indeed, the no-delay property (Lemma 5) implies that, at any default, each proposer makes a proposal that is accepted by all players.
By sequential rationality, the proposer must give the other players the minimum shares that they are willing to accept. 
Part (i)
To prove Theorem 3(i), we will construct an equilibrium σ in which, at any default x ∈ X, the selected proposer -say i -offers the committee a policy x + s i (x) ∈ ∆ n−1 , which is accepted by all players and then never amended. We can think of proposer i offering to share the amount of money not distributed yet -i.e. 1 − ∑ j∈N x j -with the the other players, with s i j (x) being the share offered by proposer i to player j. Our first step is to define these transfers. For each x ∈ X, let
Thus, any element of the n-fold product of T x , T n x , can be thought of as a vector of shares of the budgetary surplus s = (
, where s i ∈ T x stands for the shares offered by proposer
As all the u i 's are by assumption continuous, ϕ(x)(·) is a continuous function from T n x (which is convex and compact in R n 2 ) into itself. Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem then implies that there is s(
for all i ∈ N . Observe that, by construction, x + s i (x) ∈ ∆ n−1 for all i ∈ N and all x ∈ X.
We are now in a position to define the strategy profile σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ):
• In the proposal stage of any period t with ongoing default x t−1 = x, i's proposal (conditional on i being selected as proposer) is x + s i (x);
• In the voting stage of any period t with ongoing default x t−1 = x, following any proposal y ∈ X \ {x}, player i accepts if and only if
Observe that σ is a pure strategy stationary Markov strategy combination. To complete the proof of Theorem 3(i), it therefore remains to show that σ is a no-delay, stageundominated SPE. We proceed in several steps.
Claim 1: σ is no-delay with A(σ) = ∆ n−1 and, for all i ∈ N and all x ∈ X:
Proof: If x ∈ ∆ n−1 then σ prescribes all proposers to pass in all periods. This implies
. If x / ∈ ∆ n−1 then, in the next period, σ prescribes each proposer j to propose policy
for all i ∈ N . From the definition of voting strategies, therefore, player i accepts if and only if
) , which by equation (8) holds for all i ̸ = j. To prove that j's proposal is voted up, we therefore need to confirm that she accepts her own proposal. By concavity of the u i 's, equation (8) implies that
, for all i ̸ = j, which in turn implies that s 0, 1) ). Using this inequality and the concavity of u j , we obtain
where the last equality follows from (10). Thus, σ j prescribes player j to accept as well, and x j +s j (x) is therefore voted up. This proves that policies outside the simplex cannot be
This also proves that P σ (x, A(σ)) = P σ (x, ∆ n−1 ) = 1 for all x ∈ X; that is, σ is no-delay.
Moreover, as x j + s j (x) ∈ ∆ n−1 , σ prescribes all proposers to pass in all future periods.
This implies that, for all i ∈ N and x / ∈ X,
) , thus completing the proof of the claim.
For future reference (see Claim 3 below), observe that (11) implies that Proof: Let x t−1 = x, and suppose that player i is recognized to make a proposal in period t. If she plays according to σ i then she proposes x + s i (x) (or, equivalently, passes when x ∈ ∆ n−1 ). As σ is no-delay (Claim 1), this offer is accepted and player i's payoff is
Claim 2: Given default x and proposal y, each voter i ∈ N accepts if and only if
In the proof of Claim 1, we showed that
. Hence, player i cannot profitably deviate by passing or by making a proposal that is voted down.
Now consider a deviation to a proposal y ̸ = x + s i , which is accepted. According to the definition of voting strategies, y must satisfy
for all j ∈ N . We distinguish between two different cases:
• Case 1: y ∈ ∆ n−1 . In this case, inequality (12) becomes
) for all j ̸ = i (the equality is obtained from (8)). As u j is increasing, this implies that
for all j ̸ = i and, consequently,
Hence, proposing y ∈ ∆ n−1 is not a profitable (one-shot) deviation for player i.
• Case 2: y / ∈ ∆ n−1 . In this case, equations (8) and (12) imply that
Moreover, by equation (9),
Combining (13) and (14), we obtain
Hence:
This shows that proposing y / ∈ ∆ n−1 is not a profitable deviation for player i, and completes the proof of Claim 3.
Combining Claims 1-3, we obtain Theorem 3(i).
Part (ii)
Denote our game with an evolving default by Γ e , and the game with a constant default by
Let σ = (σ i ) i∈N be an SMPE of Γ e , and let π i (x) ∈ X be the proposal made by player i when the ongoing default is x in this equilibrium (recall that, by Lemma 1, σ is a pure strategy profile). Hence, player i's expected payoff as evaluated after rejection of a proposal in the first period is given by:
(recall that, by Lemma 1, σ must be no-delay).
Now define the stationary strategy profile σ c = (σ c i ) i∈N in game Γ c as follows. At the proposal stage of every period t, each player i ∈ N makes proposal π i ( x 0 ) . At the voting stage of each period, player i accepts the proposal just made, say y, if and only if
As σ is no-delay, proposal π i ( x 0 ) , i ∈ N , must be accepted with probability 1 in Γ e . By sequential rationality and unanimity rule, this implies that
is also accepted with probability 1 in any period of Γ c . Two immediate consequences of this observation are that: (i) player i's expected payoff as evaluated after rejection of a proposal in the first
; and (ii) player i ∈ N has no profitable deviation from the voting behavior prescribed by σ c i . To complete the proof of the result, therefore, it remains to show that no player i ∈ N can profitably deviate from σ c in a proposal stage of Γ c . Take an arbitrary player i.
As σ is an SMPE of Γ e , player i cannot profitably deviate by proposing another policy
instead of x or by making an unsuccessful proposal. Hence,
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 2(ii). Now consider a deviation from The theorem then follows from Merlo and Wilson (1995) Theorem 2, which implies that Baron and Ferejohn's (1989) model has a unique stationary SPE outcome when q = n.
Theorem 4. If q = n and δ i ̸ = δ j , for some i, j ∈ N , then every SPE is Pareto inefficient.
Proof:
We start the proof of Theorem 4 with the following lemma:
is the stochastic sequence of policies on some SPE path then, for any realization
Proof: Let ( x t ) be an arbitrary realization of the sequence (x t ) engendered by some SPE σ. Suppose that, contrary to the statement above, x τ j = 0 for some j ∈ N and some τ ∈ N. Lemma 1 then implies that in period 1 (with default x 0 ) player j accepted a proposal x such that x j = x t j = 0 for all t ∈ N. By sequential rationality, this implies that
= u j (0) (where h 1 stands for the period-1 implementation history at which x 1 is about to be implemented); otherwise she would be strictly better off rejecting any such proposal.
} is nonempty and, for each i ∈ W ,
, where x l denotes player l's successful proposal in period 1 (and the second inequality follows from Jensen's inequality). By continuity of the u i 's, therefore, there exists a sufficiently small ε > 0 such that
Let y = (y i ) i∈N ∈ X be defined as follows:
It is readily checked that
for all h ∈ H y and all i ∈ N .
Consider player i's proposal when she is recognized to make a proposal in period 1.
for all i ∈ N , she could successfully propose y and thus get a
. As p j > 0 and q = n (and u j (0) is obviously the minimum payoff she can get), she must therefore reject any proposal x such that x j = 0 in equilibrium.
♢
Suppose that there are i, j ∈ N such that δ i > δ j . Now suppose that, contrary to the Theorem, there exists a Pareto efficient SPE σ. Lemma 1 implies that this equilibrium can be described by a policy vector ( x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ ∆ n n−1 , such that x t = x k for all t ∈ N with probability p k . By concavity of the u k 's, the policyx ≡ ∑ k∈N p k x k is weakly preferred by all players to the lottery engendered by σ. To obtain the desired contradiction, therefore, it suffices to show that the indefinite implementation ofx can be Pareto improved.
Lemma 7 implies thatx i andx j are both in (0, 1). Consequently, there is a feasible marginal transfer dx 1 j from player i to player j in period 1, and a marginal transfer dx 2 j from j to i in period 2, such that player 1's discounted payoff remains unchanged. If we suppose by contradiction that the repeated implementation of policyx is Pareto efficient then the changes in players i and j's payoffs must satisfy:
Combining these two conditions, we obtain δ i = dx 1 j /dx 2 j ≤ δ j , which contradicts our initial assumption that δ i > δ j .
B Example of an Efficient SPE in a Nonunanimity Game
In this section, we provide an example of an efficient SPE. For expositional ease, we assume that n = 3 and q = 2. Brief inspection of our construction reveals, however, that it can easily be extended to any n ≥ 3 and any q < n. Let x * = (1, 0, 0) -evidently, the constant policy sequence {x * } is Pareto efficient, irrespective of players' preferences and discount factors. Our aim is to construct an SPE σ with four absorbing policies -x * , x −3 ≡ (1/2, 1/2, 0), x −2 ≡ (1/2, 0, 1/2), and x −1 ≡ (0, 1/2, 1/2) -when all players are
(a) Histories. We will only need to consider histories at which a proposer is about to be selected. Accordingly, we will abuse terminology by referring to such paths as "histories."
A typical period-t history is denoted byh t , and we useh t = (h t−1 ,h 1 ) to denote the concatenation of a period-(t−1) history with a one-period historyh 1 . We need to partition the set of histories into
where, for each C ⊆ N , H(C) stands for the set of histories at which the members of C should be punished -in the sense that a policy in (i) H (∅) contains all period-1 histories, and all histories at which x * has been proposed and (if there was a vote) unanimously accepted in all previous periods;
(ii) Suppose thath t−1 ∈ H(C), C ⊆ N , is followed byh 1 .
(iia) If C is empty, y = x * is proposed, and (if there is a vote) unanimously accepted
is proposed, and (if there is a vote)
(iic) If y ∈ X(C) is proposed and rejected by some nonempty
(iie) If player i proposes y / ∈ X(C) which is accepted by some nonempty C ′ ⊆ N iñ
(b) Definition of σ. Let the linear orders ◃ 1 , ◃ 2 , ◃ 3 on N be defined as follows:
. Suppose that a history in H(C), C ⊆ N , has occurred, and let d ∈ X be the current default. σ prescribes the following behavior after such a history:
In proposal stages: If C ̸ = {i} or d i = 0 then player i proposes the ◃ i -maximum in X(C); otherwise, she passes.
In a voting stage with proposal y (irrespective of the proposer):
If y ∈ X(C) then σ prescribes player j to accept x; if y / ∈ X(C) then σ prescribes player j to reject y.
According to σ, the following happens on the path. In period 1, the default is d = (0, 0, 0) and X(C) = {x * }. All proposers then propose x * which is unanimously accepted. so i passes when selected to propose. In this case, the continuation value of inducing a history in H ( x −i ) for player l ∈ {j, k} is
or, equivalently,
and the corresponding value for player i is
Observe that, for all d ∈ X and j ̸ = i, V i j (d) → u j (1/2) and V i i (d) → u i (0) as min l δ l → 1. We therefore have V l l (d) < V i l (d) < u l (1) and V l l (d) < u l (1/2) < u l (1) for all l ∈ N whenever the δ l 's are arbitrarily close to 1. Consider an arbitrary history in H ({1, 2}). If 1 is selected to propose, she offers x −2 ; if 2 is selected to propose, she offers x −1 ; if 3 is selected to propose, she offers x −2 . All offers are unanimously accepted and never amended. The payoff to player 1 is therefore u 1 (1/2) with probability p 1 + p 3 and u 1 (0) with probability p 2 , yielding an expected payoff of p 2 u 1 (0) + (p 1 + p 3 ) u 1 (1/2) < u 1 (1/2). Similarly, the expected payoffs of players 2 and 3 are (p 1 + p 3 ) u 2 (0) + p 2 u 2 (1/2) < u 2 (1/2) and u 3 (1/2). Histories in H(C) are defined similarly for any coalition C of cardinality 2.
Finally, an analogous argument reveals that, at histories in H(N ), the payoffs of players 1, 2 and 3 are respectively: p 2 u 1 (0) + (1 − p 2 ) u 1 (1/2) < u 1 (1/2), p 3 u 2 (0) + (1 − p 3 ) u 2 (1/2) < u 2 (1/2), and p 1 u 3 (0) + (1 − p 1 ) u 3 (1/2) < u 3 (1/2). Now for each player i ∈ N , consider the set of expected payoffs to player i at all histories in H(C) with i ∈ C. This is a finite set which, therefore, has a unique maximum -say m i . Discussion in the previous paragraphs implies that m i < u i (1/2) and, therefore, that
when δ i is arbitrarily close to 1. Hence, there existsδ i < 1 such that, for all j ̸ = i,
Henceforth, we assume that min l∈N δ l >δ ≡ max {δ 1 ,δ 2 ,δ 3 } . It follows from the discussion above that player i is strictly better off inducing a history in H ({j}) with j ̸ = i than inducing any history in H(C) with i ∈ C.
(c) σ an SPE: (i) Voting strategies. Suppose that a history in H(C), C ⊆ N , has occurred and that the selected proposer -say i -has offered y when the default is d.
Consider player j's play in such a situation.
• Case 1: C is empty and y = x * . Observe first that, by construction, the default is either d = (0, 0, 0) or d = (1, 0, 0). In this case, σ prescribes all players to accept x * .
Hence, in the absence of a deviation, player 1's payoff is u 1 (1) and the common payoff to the two other players is u l (0), l ∈ {2, 3}. Consider a deviation by player 1. If she rejects x * then the next proposer history will be in H ({1}) (see case (iic) in the definition of histories above). Her payoff from deviating will therefore be (1 − δ 1 ) u 1 (1) + δ 1 V 1 1 (x * ), which is strictly less than u 1 (1). This proves that voting to accept x * is an optimal, weakly undominated strategy for player 1. Now consider a deviation by player i ̸ = 1. By rejecting x * (while the two other players accept it), she induces a proposer history will be in H ({i}) (see case (iic) above). As d i = 0, her payoff from deviation is therefore u i (0). This proves that the deviation is not profitable. To see that accepting x * is not a weakly dominated strategy in the stage game, consider a strategy profile (in the stage game) in which i [resp. j / ∈ {1, i}] rejects [resp.
accepts] x * . If i votes to accept x * then the next history will be in H ({1}) (see case (iic));
if she votes to reject x * then the next history will be in H ({1, i}). It follows from the discussion in part (b) above that she is strictly better off accepting x * .
• Case 2: C is nonempty and y ∈ X(C). Let k be the player in C such that y = x −k .
In this case, σ prescribes all players to accept proposal x −k . Therefore, the next period's history will be in H ({k}). Player l's payoffs are as follows: each l ∈ {i, j} gets u l (1/2), and k gets u k (0). Now suppose that player i ̸ = k deviates by rejecting proposal x −k .
This implies that the next period's history will be in H ({i}). From the discussion in part (b), this implies that she is strictly better off accepting x −k . This proves that i cannot profitably deviate from accepting x −k , which is not a weakly dominated strategy in the stage game. Now consider a deviation by player k: If she rejects x −k then the next period's history will still be in H ({k}) (see case (iic) in the definition of histories). As she is not pivotal in the current period, her payoff remains the same and the deviation is not profitable. To see that accepting x −k is not a weakly dominated strategy in the stage game, consider a strategy profile in which i accepts x −k and j rejects it. If player k votes to accept x −k then the next period's history will be in H ({j}) (see case (iic)). If she votes to reject
x −k then, from case (iic) in the definition of histories, the next period's history will be in H ({j, k}). It follows from the discussion in part (b) above that she is strictly better off accepting x −k .
• Case 3: y is not in X(C). Let the proposer be i. In this case, σ prescribes all players to reject y. From case (iid) in the definition of histories, the next period's history will be in H ({i}). If player j ̸ = i deviates by accepting y then the next period's history will be in H ({j}) (see case (iie)). It follows from the discussion in part (b) that she is strictly better off rejecting y. Hence, player j ̸ = i cannot profitably deviate and rejecting y is not a weakly dominated strategy in the stage game. Now consider a deviation by player i. If she accepts her own proposal y then she obtains the same payoff as that from rejecting y: she is not pivotal in the current period and the next period's history is still in H ({i}). This proves that she cannot profitably deviate from rejecting y. To see that rejecting y is not weakly dominated in the stage game, consider an extra-equilibrium profile in which j accepts y and k rejects it. If i accepts y then the next period's history will be in H ({ij}); if she rejects y then the next period's history will be in H ({j}) (see case (iie)). The discussion in part (b) then implies that she is strictly better off rejecting y.
(ii) Proposal strategies. Take an arbitrary history in H(C), C ⊆ N , and let d ∈ X be the current default. If proposer i offers y ∈ X(C) then, from the definition of voting strategies, y is unanimously accepted (and never amended). Her payoff is therefore u i (y i ).
If she offers y / ∈ X(C) instead, then y is unanimously rejected and the next period's history is in H ({i}) (see (iid) in the definition of histories). Hence, her payoff is
We now prove that σ prescribes optimal behavior at any such history. To this end, suppose first that C ̸ = {i}. According to σ i , proposer i should offer the ◃ i -maximum element y in X(C) -so that y i ∈ {1/2, 1} -thus obtaining a payoff of u i (y i ) ≥ 1/2.
By construction, she can only obtain a lower payoff by proposing another policy in X(C). By the One-Shot Deviation Principle, σ is an SPE.
